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Introduction 
 
Pirates are popular. Inside academia and out, the pirate is a figure command-
ing attention, fascination and quite often sympathy. Interpreted in various ways 
– as vicious criminals, romantic heroes, sexual revolutionaries or anarchistic 
opponents of capitalism – pirates possess an apparently inexhaustible appeal.2 
The problem with “pirates,” of course, is that defining them is largely a ques-
tion of perspective: perpetrators of maritime violence from Francis Drake to 
Blackbeard have been seen as both champions and murderers, and scholars 
have interrogated this very dimension of piracy as a historical concept. In the 
Mediterranean, the corso was far more complicated than just a clash between 
                                                        
1I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding 
the doctoral work on which this article is based; Daniel Lange, for conversations and 
feedback all the way through writing; and others who offered comments, including my 
fellow contributors to the forum and Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood and David Smith. 
 
2For a mixture of romance and criminal tendencies, see Evelyn Berckman, 
Victims of Piracy: The Admiralty Court, 1575-1678 (London, 1979); and Peter Earle, 
The Pirate Wars (London, 2003). For the question of sexuality, see B.R. Burg, Sodomy 
and the Pirate Tradition: English Sea Rovers in the Seventeenth-Century Caribbean 
(New York, 1995; originally published as Sodomy and the Perception of Evil: English 
Sea Rovers in the Seventeenth-Century Caribbean [New York, 1983]); and Hans 
Turley, Rum, Sodomy and the Lash: Piracy, Sexuality, and Masculine Identity (New 
York, 1999). For anarchists, see Marcus Rediker, “‘Under the Banner of King Death’: 
The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716-1726,” William and Mary Quar-
terly, 3rd ser., XXXVIII, No. 2 (1981), 203-227; Rediker, Villains of all Nations: 
Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (London, 2004); and Peter Lamborn Wilson, Pirate 
Utopias: Moorish Corsairs and European Renegadoes (Brooklyn, NY, 1995, 2nd rev. 
ed., Brooklyn, NY, 2003). For a general overview, see David J. Starkey, “Voluntaries 
and Sea Robbers: A Review of the Academic Literature on Privateering, Corsairing, 
Buccaneering and Piracy,” Mariner’s Mirror, XCVII, No. 1 (2011), 127-147. For 
reflections on the appeal of pirates, see Shannon Lee Dawdy and Joe Bonni, “Towards 
a General Theory of Piracy,” Anthropological Quarterly, LXXXV, No. 3 (2012), 673-
700. 
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cross and crescent, while in the Indian Ocean “pirate” was a label deployed 
quite deliberately as part of imperial politics of legitimization and domination.3 
 In the British Atlantic, such critical attention has largely been directed 
at the “golden age of piracy” during the later seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries.4 For the earlier stages of British maritime expansion, the pirate as a 
literary figure, and the legal and high political implications of maritime vio-
lence for European empires in general, have both received a good deal of at-
tention.5 On the other hand, scholarship on actual British “pirates” during the 
                                                        
3On the Mediterranean, see Salvatore Bono, I Corsari Barbareschi: Prefazi-
one di Renzo De Felice (Turin, 1964); Bono, Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e 
Musulmani fra guerra, schiavitù e commercio (Milan, 1993); Michel Fontenay, La 
Méditerranée entre la Croix et la Crescent: Navigation, Commerce, Course et Piraterie 
(XVIe-XIXe Siècle) (Paris, 2010); and Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Mer-
chants: A Maritime History of the Early Modern Mediterranean (Princeton, 2010). On 
the Indian Ocean, see the contributions in this forum by Derek Elliott and Simon 
Layton; see also Patricia Risso, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Vio-
lence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth 
Century,” Journal of World History, XII, No. 2 (2001), 293-319; Sebastian R. Prange, 
“A Trade of No Dishonor: Piracy, Commerce, and Community in the Western Indian 
Ocean, Twelfth to Sixteenth Century,” American Historical Review, CXVI, No. 5 
(2011), 1269-1293; Simon Layton, “Discourses of Piracy in an Age of Revolutiona,” 
Itinerario, XXXV, No. 2 (2011), 81-97; Layton, “The ‘Moghul’s Admiral’: Angrian 
‘Piracy’ and the Rise of British Bombay,” Journal of Early Modern History, XVII, No. 
1 (2013), 1-19; and Robert J. Antony, “Turbulent Waters: Sea Raiding in Early Mod-
ern South East Asia,” Mariner’s Mirror, XCIX, No. 1 (2013), 23-38. 
 
4Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Cam-
bridge, MA, 1986); C.R. Pennell (ed.), Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader (New York, 
2001); Rediker, Villians; Joel H. Baer (ed.), British Piracy in the Golden Age: History 
and Intepretation, 1660-1730 (4 vols., London, 2007); Peter T. Leeson, The Invisible 
Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton, NJ, 2009); Lauren Benton, A 
Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cam-
bridge, 2010), esp. chap. 3; and Benton, “Towards a New Legal History of Piracy: 
Maritime Legalities and the Myth of Universal Jurisdiction,” International Journal of 
Maritime History, XXIII, No. 1 (2011), 225-240. Though Benton’s conclusions are 
broader, most of her evidence for pirates is drawn from this “golden age” period. See 
also Rebecca Simon, “The Social Construction of Crime in the Atlantic World: Piracy 
as a Case Study,” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, VI, No. 6 
(2012), 75-88; and David J. Starkey, E.S. van Eyck van Heslinga and J.A. de Moor 
(eds.), Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries (Exeter, 1997). 
 
5Anne Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and Law on the 
Seas, 1450-1850,” in James D. Tracy (ed.), The Political Economy of Merchant Em-
pires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750  (New York, 1991, 2nd ed., New 
York, 1997), 196-227; Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: 
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first half of the seventeenth century has tended towards narrative accounts, 
focusing on their practices or the efforts of governments to suppress them.6 
Discussions of maritime violence during the early stages of British imperial 
expansion focus on the role played by “privateers,” a term which did not in 
fact appear until the later seventeenth century.7 While it is routinely acknowl-
edged that “pirate” and “privateer” were ideas which blurred into one another, 
historians continue to treat them as different kinds of activity, accepting the 
juxtaposition of “pirate” and “society” and perpetuating both the prejudices 
and confusions of contemporaries. A sustained consideration of how these la-
bels were deployed by the seafarers themselves during this early period, as 
provided by Lauren Benton for the “golden age,” is currently lacking.8 
                                                                                                                            
State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1994); 
Elizabeth Mancke, “Early Modern Expansion and the Politicization of Oceanic Space,” 
Geographical Review, LXXXIX, No. 2 (1999), 225-236; Mancke, “Oceanic Spaces 
and the Creation of a Global International System, 1450-1800,” in Daniel Finamore 
(ed.), Maritime History as World History (Gainesville, FL, 2004), 149-166; Claire 
Jowitt (ed.), Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 1550-1650 (Basingstoke, 2006); Jowitt, 
“Rogue Traders: National Identity, Empire and Piracy, 1580-1640,” in Thomas Bet-
teridge (ed.), Borders and Travellers in Early Modern Europe (Aldershot, 2007), 53-
70; Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy, 1580-1630: English Literature and Seaborne Crime 
(Farnham, 2010); Peter Kempe, “‘Even in the Remotest Corners of the World:’ Glob-
alized Piracy and International Law, 1500-1900,” Journal of Global History, V, No. 3  
(2010), 353-372; and Caroline Laurent, “Le Pirate, acteur interstitiel de la colonisation 
européenne dans les Caraïbes (XVIe-XVIIe siècles),” Diacronie: Studi di Storia Con-
temporanea, XIII, No. 1 (2013), 1-17. 
 
6C.M. Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday (Newton 
Abbot, 1976); David D. Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, 1616-1642 (Alder-
shot, 1994); John C. Appleby, “A Nursery of Pirates: The English Pirate Community 
in Ireland in the Early Seventeenth Century,” International Journal of Maritime His-
tory, II, No. 1 (1990), 1-27; Appleby, “The Problem of Piracy in Ireland, 1570-1630,” 
in Jowitt (ed.), Pirates?, 41-55; Appleby, Under the Bloody Flag: Pirates of the Tudor 
Age (Stroud, 2009); Appleby, “Jacobean Piracy: Elizabethan Maritime Depredation in 
Transition, 1603-1625,” in Cheryl Fury (ed.), The Social History of English Seamen, 
1489-1649 (Woodbridge, 2012), 277-299; and David J. Starkey, “Pirates and Mar-
kets,” in Lewis R. Fischer (ed.), The Market for Seamen in the Age of Sail (St. John’s, 
1994), 59-80. 
 
7Kenneth R. Andrews’ work on privateers has been influential in this respect; 
see Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Spanish War, 1585-1603 
(Cambridge, 1964); Drake’s Voyages: A Re-assessment of their Place in Elizabethan 
Maritime Expansion (London, 1967); and Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime 
Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge, 1984). 
 
8Benton, Search for Sovereignty, chap. 3. 
 at University of Exeter on July 3, 2014ijh.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Richard J. Blakemore 
 
 
162 
 This article aims to make some suggestions in this direction, to link 
the solid empirical work of early modern historians of piracy with the critical 
approach of literary and theoretical studies, as has been done for the Mediter-
ranean and Indian Ocean. The politics of piracy constituted an important part 
of the process through which the British state began to exercise, or attempt to 
exercise, authority across the Atlantic maritime networks which expanded sig-
nificantly during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.9 But it was a 
politics played not just by the state but by seafarers themselves: Benton has 
described how seafarers acted as “lawyers,” exploiting the complex legal situa-
tion of the early modern sea.10 Piracy was not necessarily a form of “social 
resistance.”11 Rather, since violence was a regular element in maritime travel 
and trade, the label “pirate” was an important part of the often triangular dia-
logue between seaborne actors and various state authorities through which each 
attempted to legitimize their own and delegitimize others’ violent actions. The 
politics of piracy in the Atlantic drew upon language and ideas developed first 
in Mediterranean and European waters, but its deployment at the edges of (and 
sometimes beyond) British imperial authority in the Atlantic contributed both 
to the definition and expansion of that authority. 
 I focus upon the 1640s because the civil wars of this decade, with the 
consonant collapse of a single state power in Britain and the consequent vying 
claims to authority by different combatants, reveal particularly clearly how 
“piracy” was constructed and utilized, as actors on all sides co-opted this con-
cept for their own polemical ends. This decade was also part of the transitional 
phase in which the British government, more clearly in the 1650s and after, 
emerged as a maritime power with more deliberate interventionist policies in 
seafaring and trade, most of all in the Atlantic.12 The article begins by intro-
ducing how “piracy” was depicted, legally and politically, in the early seven-
teenth century, before considering how it was used in propaganda debates dur-
ing the civil wars and, then, how seafarers themselves and others applied it to 
specific occasions through a particular case of seaborne violence across the 
Atlantic on the coast of Maryland.  
 
                                                        
9The best overview of this maritime expansion remains Ralph Davis, The Rise 
of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, 
1962; new ed., St. John’s, 2012). 
 
10Benton, Search for Sovereignty, 34 and 112-120. 
 
11“Social resistance” is the term used by Wilson, Pirate Utopias, 21-22. 
 
12On the 1640s, see Richard J. Blakemore, “The London and Thames Mari-
time Community during the British Civil Wars, 1640-1649” (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
Cambridge University, 2013); on the 1650s, see Bernard Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The 
Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660 (Oxford, 1989). 
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Proclaiming Pirates in the Seventeenth Century 
 
Violence at sea was a fact of life for seafarers during the early modern period. 
According to the standard wording of ships’ bills of sale, owners were not 
financially responsible in cases of “perills of the sea, dangers and enemies” – 
another wording exempted “Fyer water Enemies pirates casualties of the Seas, 
and restraint of Princes” – and acts of piracy were covered by maritime insur-
ance policies from their earliest development.13 In a period before the protec-
tion of trade became the sole preserve of state forces, most merchant ships 
were armed and prepared not only to defend themselves but also to take advan-
tage of opportunities for further profit.14 Edward Coxere, a sailor during the 
1650s, regularly participated in violence; after he converted to Quakerism he 
found that his career was curtailed by his newfound pacifism.15 
 This situation was nevertheless shaped by the legal and popular idea 
of the “pirate.” In medieval Europe, maritime violence was legal only when 
authorized by a sovereign in wartime or in “reprisal” of wrongs formerly 
committed, but the shifting diplomatic situation in Europe and, increasingly, 
around the globe, and the later development of “reprisal” as a legal fiction to 
cover maritime aggression, considerably complicated the actual circumstances 
at sea. Even so, the figure of the pirate was remarkably clear, if only in prin-
ciple; any unauthorized maritime violence was piracy. The classical definition 
of pirates as hostes humani generis was invoked, for example by the English 
lawyer Edward Coke, and seems to have had a wide purchase.16 In early mod-
                                                        
13Quoting National Maritime Museum (NMM), AND/18 (my emphasis); and 
Great Britain, National Archives (TNA/PRO), High Court of Admiralty (HCA) 30/548, 
fol. 77v; for insurance, see Adrian Leonard’s contribution in this forum. 
 
14On “protection” as a factor in maritime trade, see Frederic C. Lane, “Na-
tional Wealth and Protection Costs” and “The Economic Meaning of War and Protec-
tion,” both in Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane (Balti-
more, 1966), 372-398; see also Niels Steensgaard, “Violence and the Rise of Capital-
ism: Frederic C. Lane’s Theory of Protection and Tribute,” Review (Fernand Braudel 
Centre), V, No. 2 (1981), 247-273. 
 
15E.H.W. Meyerstein (ed.), Adventures by Sea of Edward Coxere (Oxford, 
1945). 
 
16On the legal definition, see Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Newport, 
RI, 1988; 3rd ed., Honolulu, 2006), chap. 1; Christopher Harding, “‘Hostis Humani 
Generis’ – The Pirate as Outlaw in the Early Modern Law of the Sea,” in Jowitt (ed.), 
Pirates?, 20-38; Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Na-
tions (New York, 2009), chap. 8; and Benton, Search for Sovereignty, chap. 3. On 
medieval piracy, see Bryan D. Dick, “‘Framing Piracy’: Restitution at Sea in the Later 
Middle Ages” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2010), esp. chap. 2. I 
am grateful to Tom Johnson for this last reference. 
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ern reproductions of the medieval rôles d’Oléron, the final clause stated that 
for “Pirates, Robbers, Sea-Rovers, Turks, or other Enemies to our…Catholick 
Faith, every man may deal with such as with meer Brutes, and despoil them of 
their goods without any punishment for so doing.”17 Pirates, then, were inhu-
man, rejected by the norms of European society, and the terms used to de-
scribe them are also revealing. Vice-Admiral John Pennington’s journal of 
1632-1636 used the same words – “Pirates and Robbers” and “Rovers,” as 
well as “Pickeroones” – as did naval instructions.18 “Rovers” in particular 
emphasizes the aspect of mobility and unrootedness thought to characterize 
pirates, seafarers who did not follow legitimate trade routes but moved ran-
domly and chaotically in search of plunder. According to one early seven-
teenth-century pamphlet, pirates when challenged described themselves as “of 
the sea.”19 
 Naturally, notwithstanding its conceptual clarity, this imagined figure 
was rarely the reality. First of all, it was a judgment applied to seafarers by 
authorities; in the same pamphlet, recounting the trial and execution of pirates 
in 1609, none of the convicted described themselves as pirates (though they 
accused others), but two used the revealing phrase “I was proclaimed a 
Pyrate.”20 Henry Mainwaring, erstwhile admiral of the corsair fleet at Algiers, 
wrote a treatise on piracy for James VI and I, probably in 1616-1617, in which 
he described the economic stimuli for entering piracy: because “the common 
sort of seamen are so generally necessitated and discontented.”21 More impor-
                                                        
17Citing the copy printed in John Godolphin, Synegoros Thalassios: A View of 
the Admiral Jurisdiction (London, 1661; reprint, Memphis, TN, 2012), 196; it also 
appears in the copy printed in Guy Miege, The Ancient Sea-Laws of Oleron, Wisby, and 
the Hanse-Towns (London, 1686; reprint, Ann Arbor, 2011), a translation of Etienne 
Cleirac, Us et Coustvmes de la Mer (Bordeaux, 1647; reprint, Paris, 2012); for manu-
script copies, see NMM, PLA/6, fols. 1r-27v, and REC/3, fols. 15r-22r. On the ori-
gins of this law, see James W. Shephard, “The Rôles d’Oléron: A Lex Mercatoria of 
the Sea?” in Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), From Lex Mercatoria to Commercial Law (Berlin, 
2005), 207-253; and Edda Frankot, “Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby: 
Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea,” in Juan Pan-Motojo and Frederik Pederson (eds.), 
Communities in European History: Representations, Jurisdictions, Conflicts (Pisa, 
2007), 151-172.  
 
18NMM, JOD/1/1, fols. 1r, 3r, 25v, 27r, 29v, 30r, 48r, 89r, 101v and 103v; 
for naval instructions, see fols. 71r-2r, and LEC/5, fols. 2r-7r. 
 
19Anon., The Lives, Apprehensions, Arraignments, and Executions, of the 19 
Late Pyrates (London, 1609), signatures F4v; cf. Rediker, Villains of All Nations, 8. 
 
20Anon., Lives, Apprehensions, signatures B3r and C2r (my emphasis). 
 
21Henry Mainwaring, The Life and Works of Sir Henry Mainwaring (2 vols., 
London, 1920-1922; reprint, Charleston, SC, 2012), II, 14. 
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tant, he commented that there was “a received opinion and custom that is here 
for the most part used, that none but the Captain, Master, and it may be some 
few of the principal of the Company shall be put to death” and described the 
practice of “Perforst-men,” who pretended they had been forced to join a pi-
rate crew when their merchant vessel was seized, and so were “rather wel-
comed home, than any way molested or troubled.”22 On two separate occa-
sions William Monson, a Jacobean naval officer, encountered “pirates” who 
had previously served in his own ship.23 These writers implied that seafarers 
moved “in” and “out” of piracy; but it was not the seafarers, or their practice 
of violence, which shifted, but the labels which were applied to them. 
  Furthermore, as David J. Starkey has argued, piracy was an “eco-
nomic activity” with a “parasitic” nature.24 Pirates might be imagined as in-
human enemies of all humanity, but seaborne raiding could not exist outside of 
the framework of maritime trade, and the question of authorization and label-
ling muddied waters considerably. For example, on one occasion Pennington 
seized a “Biskener” reported to be a pirate, but found that that it carried a law-
ful commission from the Spanish king.25 In a similar way, one of those exe-
cuted in 1609 claimed that when he seized a Portuguese “Carvil” he was sail-
ing with a legitimate commission from the Dutch, even though it had been 
declared illegal by the British government for British sailors “to combine with 
the hollanders in any such attempts.”26 
 This highlights how maritime violence could be authorized by some 
polities but not recognized as such by others, and it is important to notice the 
difference between “piracy” as occasional activity and “piraticality” as a char-
acteristic.27 Certain groups were considered inherently piratical. In early mod-
ern England this was primarily the Irish and the corsairs of Algiers, Tunis and 
Salé. Mainwaring called Ireland “the Nursery and Storehouse of Pirates,” and 
                                                        
22Ibid., 18-19 and 22-23. 
 
23Michael Oppenheim (ed.), Sir William Monson’s Naval Tracts (6 vols., 
London, 1703; reprint, London, 1902-1914), III, 57, and V, 293-300. 
 
24Starkey, “Pirates and Markets,” 59 and 61; cf. Fontenay, La Méditerranée, 
12: “La butin corsaire est fonction de la prospérité des victimes.” 
 
25NMM, JOD/1/1, fol. 29v. 
 
26Anon., Lives, Apprehensions, signatures F2v-3r. 
 
 27Here I am following Simon Layton, “Commerce, Authority and Piracy in 
the Indian Ocean World, c. 1780-1850” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cam-
bridge, 2013); see also Heller-Roazen, Enemy of All, 36-27 and 110-111. 
 at University of Exeter on July 3, 2014ijh.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Richard J. Blakemore 
 
 
166 
Monson singled out Broadhaven as “the well-head of all pirates.”28 Even 
though Muslim corsairs were legally approved by the Maghreb regencies, they 
were condemned by Europeans as, to quote one English merchant, “a dissolute 
and resolute company of Sea-farers and Pirates.”29 This coincided with anxiety 
about religious vulnerability: the fact that some “pirates” were also European 
“renegades” made it easier to depict them as enemies of Christian civiliza-
tion.30 The famous English and Dutch renegades John Ward and Zymen Dan-
seker were vilified in print.31 Naval expeditions were launched against Ireland, 
Algiers and Salé, none of them particularly successful, but nevertheless dem-
onstrating that punitive action against such “piratical” communities was con-
sidered legitimate by the British government. Monson wrote that “the Algeri-
nes are a sort of outlaws, or miscreants that live in enmity with all the 
world.”32  
 In the early seventeenth century there was a spectrum of labels for 
maritime violence which ranged from the authorized to the ambiguous to the 
irredeemable. While this was based on theoretically clear principles, drawing 
on classical and medieval traditions, it was also subject to the international 
circumstances of the day and was therefore challengeable and negotiable. Ac-
cusations of “piraticality” helped to provide some definition to the vague di-
mensions of “piracy,” but these labels were neither constant nor concrete. This 
becomes even more evident when we examine the British civil wars of the 
1640s. 
 
                                                        
28Mainwaring, Life and Works, II, 15-17; and Oppenheim (ed.), Monson’s 
Naval Tracts, III, 59. 
 
29Lewes Roberts, The Merchants Mappe of Commerce (London, 1638; re-
print, Charleston, SC, 2010), 73; for other examples, see Anon., A Relation Strange 
and True, of a Ship of Bristol named the Jacob (London, 1622); and John Rawlins, The 
Famous and Wonderfull Recoverie of a Ship of Bristoll, called the Exchange, from the 
Turkish Pirates of Argier (London, 1622; reprint, Ann Arbor, 2010). 
 
30For an overview of Britain and the Maghreb, see Nabil Matar, Britain and 
Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainsville, FL, 2005); for the broader Mediterranean, see the 
works cited above in note 2. 
 
31Anon., Newes from Sea, of Two Notorious Pyrats, Ward the Englishman 
and Danseker the Dutchman (London, 1609). 
 
32Oppenheim (ed.), Monson’s Naval Tracts, III, 56-69, and his comments on 
the Algiers expedition, 79-116; see also N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A 
Naval History of Britain, 660-1649 (London, 1997), 350-353 and 384-385; and Kenneth 
R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of 
Charles I (Cambridge, 1999), chap. 7. 
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The Civil Wars: “Pirats of Our Own Nation” 
 
The internecine conflicts which erupted within Britain in the late 1630s and 
1640s brought with them a similar outbreak of violence and disruption to the 
lives of seafarers.33 There were few major engagements, but blockading and 
commerce raiding were carried out by parliamentarians, royalists and Irish 
confederates alike. Unsurprisingly, all sides condemned the actions of the oth-
ers, and to do this deployed “piracy,” indicating both its cultural resonance 
and its emotive power. Proclamations by Charles I calling on the Royal Navy 
(most of which had sided with parliament) to return to its former loyalty 
tended to characterize his opponents as “rebels,” especially parliament’s admi-
ral the Earl of Warwick whom Charles claimed “traiterously presume[d] to 
usurpe to himself the Soveraignty of the Seas.”34 While parliament also ac-
cused the Irish as “rebels,” it directed the label of “piracy” against royalists. 
One declaration by parliament described how the “Seas [are] already infested, 
not onely by Sea Rovers, by Commissions from the Rebels in Ireland, but also 
by Pirats of our own Nation.”35 This is an interesting distinction, implicitly 
recognizing the authorization of Irish “Sea Rovers” (although denying the le-
gitimacy of the authorizers as “Rebels”) but condemning those authorized by 
the king. 
 More striking is the use of these terms in the popular printed literature 
of the civil wars, and here too partisan writers for both king and parliament 
applied the language of piracy to their opponents. Mercvrivs Avlicvs, a royalist 
newspaper, protested that a parliamentary order to issue letters of marque 
would “fill the Seas so full of Pirates…[that] they will in conclusion destroy all 
trade.”36 On the other side, Captain William Smith described in his published 
letters an engagement with a royalist vessel, reportedly telling its captain that 
“it did seem strange unto me, that he should dare to take the Kings name in his 
mouth, in regard that both he and his confederates appeared unto me to be 
Pyrats, and Sea-Rovers,” and that he was determined “to seize on their per-
                                                        
33The best summary of the civil wars at sea is Bernard Capp, “Naval Opera-
tions,” in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.), The Civil Wars: A Military History 
of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1660 (Oxford, 1998), 156-192. See also Elaine 
Murphy, Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641-1653 (Woodbridge, 2012); and Blakemore, 
“London and Thames Maritime Community,” esp. chap. 4. 
 
34Charles I, By the King: A Proclamation for the Safety of his Majesties Navy, 
and the Kingdome (Oxford, 10 February 1642[/3]). 
 
35Parliament, A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parlia-
ment, for the Speedy Setting Forth of a Fleet of Ships to Sea, for the Defence of the 
Kingdome (London, 14 March 1642[/3]). 
 
36Mercurius Aulicus, 19-25 March 1643, signature Yr. 
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sons, and ships, as Pirats, or sinck by their side.”37 Perhaps the most remark-
able passage comes from a pamphlet published on Warwick’s authority in 1643 
in which the royalists were castigated as “Arch-Pyrates” who “have taken 
Falmouth Haven in Cornwall, which with roaving and robberies they make a 
kind of Algier.”38 The royalists could play this game, too: one parliamentarian, 
Captain Robert Zachary, was called a “Renegado…circumcised in the law of 
Mohammed” and, in Mercvrivs Aulicvs, “a Native Turke, who having been a 
Pyrate, is thereby so qualified for the Rebels service…not only as he is a Turke 
(to this day unchristened) but because of his Piracy.”39 In the 1640s, as previ-
ously, the assumed piraticality of certain groups or places – here, the Maghreb 
– easily invoked piracy for immediate polemical ends, made all the more reso-
nant by the continued problem of the capture and enslavement of seafarers 
there.40 
 As this demonstrates, the war did not happen in isolation, and the 
combatant groupings accusing one another were also engaged in disputes with 
various European powers over the seizure of ships. Parliament protested to the 
Spanish Netherlands and the United Provinces over the recruitment and supply 
of royalist ships from their ports, and there were arguments with the French, 
who in their turn complained of the “Pirateries made upon them by the English 
nation.”41 In June 1644 the Dutch ambassadors reported daily complaints of 
“manifold damages at sea.”42 In this regard the use of “piracy” as a label in 
civil war propaganda tapped into a regular conversation among different Euro-
pean governments and seafarers over which violence was, or was not, piracy. 
What emerges is a confusing clamour in which agreement was reached only 
when it suited the immediate aims of both parties. This testifies to the impor-
                                                        
37William Smith, Severall Letters of Great Importance, and Good Successe 
(London, 1643; reprint, Ann Arbor, 2012), 2. 
 
38Anon., The Sea-Mans Protestation Renewed, Confirmed, and Enlarged 
(London, 1643), signature A4v. 
 
39British Library (BL), Additional Manuscripts (Add. MS) 17,677 R, fol. 
230r, “Renegado…circoncis dans le loy de Mahomet;” Mercurius Aulicus, 29 Decem-
ber-5 January 1644[/5], 1321; for a parliamentarian response, see Mercurius Britani-
cus, 20-27 January 1645, 529. 
 
40On this issue, see Blakemore, “London and Thames Maritime Community,” 
103-108. 
 
41BL, Add. MS 4200, f. 15r; for more detail, and original citations, see 
Blakemore, “London and Thames Maritime Community,” 170-173. 
 
42BL, Add. MS 17,677 R, fols. 312r-12r, “Dagelijck comen tot ons vele 
clachten, over meenichvuldige beschadicheden ter zee.” 
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tance of understanding and analyzing a politics of piracy, drawing on medieval 
and Mediterranean models in which the labelling of maritime violence as “pi-
racy” or its perpetrators as “pirates” was just as significant as the act itself. 
 
Pirates on the Edge 
 
To argue that piracy was part of a confusing clamour is perhaps not very ana-
lytically satisfying, but it is not surprising that states or political groupings 
defended the actions of their own maritime forces and condemned others, or 
that they used resonant and recognized language to do so. Just as important are 
the strategic ways in which the seafarers engaged in maritime violence them-
selves deployed or reacted to the rhetorics and politics of piracy. By analyzing 
these we can bring together not only the political language and the reality of 
experiences of maritime violence but also two of the broader themes of this 
forum: the relationship between governments and seafarers, and the expanding 
claims of the British imperial polity to maritime control, in this case in the 
Atlantic. 
 To some extent, seafarers echoed the official and printed sources al-
ready discussed. Valentine Austen, purser of Swallowe, described how the 
ship’s master, William Greene, had letters of marque to seize all ships “in the 
possession of the Rebells of Ireland…[or] in the possession of Pirates,” defini-
tions which coincided: they captured Unicorne, whose crew Austen described 
as “Pirates” because they “had runne away with the said shippe…intend[ing] to 
goe for Gallowaye in Ireland.”43 We might expect to find depositions in legal 
sources and statements by parliament’s supporters accepting the terms imposed 
by the authorities, but seafarers also used the term “piracy” in more independ-
ent ways. Robert Anderson, master of Seahorse, had loaded a cargo of coals at 
the royalist port of Newcastle but was seized by a parliamentarian ship, Hart. 
Anderson had ignored parliament’s proclamations forbidding trade with its 
enemies, but Hart’s crew began to sell Anderson’s cargo before his ship was 
declared a prize, which he complained in court “was little better than piracy 
soe to do.”44 While Anderson could not challenge parliament’s judgment on 
the legitimacy of his trade to Newcastle, he could use “piracy” as a language 
to criticize the conduct of the authorized violence of which he was a victim. 
 Such accusations of piracy had a wider relevance to British maritime 
authority, especially as this began to expand into the Atlantic. An incident in-
volving a London ship, Reformation, and a Rotterdam vessel, Looking Glasse, 
                                                        
43TNA/PRO, HCA 13/131, fols. 119r-v; cf. HCA 13/60, deposition of Peter 
Craye, 20 February 1645[/6]. 
 
44TNA/pro, HCA 13/59, deposition of Robert Anderson, 26 February 
1643[/4]; for more on Anderson, see Blakemore, “London and Thames Maritime 
Community,” 188-189. 
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reveals how the circumstances of civil war offered seafarers new opportunities 
to legitimize the violence they conducted at the edges of imperial authority.45 
Reformation seized Looking Glasse in Chesapeake Bay in February 1645 and 
proceeded to plunder the colony of Maryland. This event erupted from a per-
sonal dispute between Reformation’s master, Richard Ingle, and Maryland’s 
governors who had previously imprisoned him; but it was also linked back to 
the first case tried in Maryland’s general assembly, when rivalries over the 
Island of Kent resulted in clashes in the Bay and the assembly condemning and 
executing five Virginians as “pirates.”46 The assembly had thus from the first 
claimed to themselves the right to judge acts of maritime violence in the same 
European legal terminology of “piracy,” and when Ingle seized his colonial 
opponents and carried them as prisoners to London, they accused him in a 
petition to parliament’s admiralty committee as “a mere pyrate.”47 Unsurpris-
ingly, the crew of Looking Glasse agreed.48 They attempted to portray this as a 
straightforward case of unauthorized maritime violence. 
 Ingle and his men, however, slotted their activities into the polemical 
and religious arguments parliament was itself publishing in Britain. Conven-
iently ignoring the personal side of the dispute, Ingle’s sailors in their deposi-
tions to the admiralty court pointed out that Maryland was ruled by a Catholic 
minority who threatened the Protestant majority. The colony’s governor, 
moreover, had a commission from the king to seize London ships, an act of 
hostility against parliament, and Looking Glasse had prepared to fight against 
Reformation in collusion with the planters.49 This interpretation mimicked par-
liament’s claims that Charles I was the victim of a “malignant” Catholic con-
spiracy which had started the civil war.50 Ingle himself presented his actions as 
defensive; only after “haveinge two severall tymes found [Maryland’s gover-
nor]…fightinge against the Parliament of England & theire adherents” (pre-
sumably meaning himself) did he attack, “w[hi]ch as he beleeveth he might 
lawfullie doe by vertue of his Comission, and was bounde unto by the solemne 
                                                        
45For more detail on this event and the characters involved, see Timothy B. 
Riordan, The Plundering Time: Maryland in the English Civil War, 1642-50 (Balti-
more, 2003); and Blakemore, “London and Thames Maritime Community,” 227-239. 
 
46Blakemore, “London and Thames Maritime Community,” 228-229.  
 
47TNA/PRO, HCA 30/855, fols. 227r-30r. 
 
48Blakemore, “London and Thames Maritime Community,” 235. 
 
49Ibid., 236-237. 
 
50For an overview of civil war polemic, see Michael Braddick, God’s Fury, 
England’s Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars (London, 2008). 
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nationall vowe and Covenant.”51 The “Covenant” was an oath sworn by par-
liament’s followers, Ingle’s “Comission” was a letter of marque.52 Ingle de-
picted his maritime violence as entirely legitimate, justifying it in the relig-
iously polemical language and documents issued by parliament itself. 
 This case is instructive because it highlights the contingency of these 
developments, the role of personal relationships and circumstances, and the 
possibilities for maritime violence to become inflected with broader cultural 
and political implications. The governors of Maryland had, with their accusa-
tion of piracy, appealed to British state authority; by describing his actions in 
parliament’s terms, Ingle too was simultaneously appropriating that authority 
and reinforcing it. He was neither the first nor the last, and was certainly not 
the most famous seafarer to manipulate imperial political rhetoric in explana-
tion of his own actions. In fact, it is his very lack of fame (outside of Mary-
land, anyway) which makes this incident important, showing that not only no-
torious pirates during the “golden age” but all kinds of seafarers, from the 
very beginning of British maritime expansion, were engaged in the dialogue 
over “piracy” with metropolitan politicians through which the edges of impe-
rial power were defined and developed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Claire Jowitt has written that “the early modern pirate was one of a number of 
actors operating within and exploiting the existing rules of an evolving mari-
time legal space.”53 As we have seen, however, it is difficult to talk about “the 
early modern pirate” except as a literary or theoretical figure – rather, we 
should consider early modern piracy, a shifting category applied to or adopted 
by seafarers. “Pirates” were neither romantic heroes nor anarchists engaged in 
“social resistance.” They were seafarers using, or ensnared by, a potent lan-
guage which could frame their own actions and challenge those of others with 
reference to this “evolving maritime legal space,” and by doing so contributing 
to its evolution.54 The dialogue about this category between seafarers and the 
state was a crucial element in the development of British maritime imperialism 
                                                        
51TNA/PRO, HCA 13/119, answers of Richard Ingle, 31 July and 29 Sep-
tember 1645. 
 
52On the “Covenant,” see Edward Vallance, Revolutionary England and the 
National Covenant: State Oaths, Protestantism and the Political Nation, 1533-1682 
(Woodbridge, 2005), 57-60 and 119-129. 
 
53Claire Jowitt, “Introduction: Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 1550-1650,” 
in Jowitt (ed.), Pirates?, 15. 
 
54Benton, Search for Sovereignty, chap. 3. 
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and the parameters and extent of state power, and at least in the early stages, 
there was a good deal of ambiguity and manoeuvrability for seafarers. Despite 
legal and rhetorical claims to the contrary, piracy was politics. 
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